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Chinese Entertainment Industry, the
Case of Folk Errenzhuan
Haili Ma
Following the past thirty years of economic development in China, a substantial amount
of research on rural migrants and urbanization has emerged. However, few address
traditional art forms and their related socio-economic transformation. This paper
scrutinizes how errenzhuan, a Northeast folk peasant sing-song art form, developed to
become a national entertainment industry within a decade, only to crumble under a
change of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) political direction. It argues that the
trajectory path of errenzhuan reveals distinctive features of the Chinese cultural
industry, which is developed under the dual pressures of economic success and CCP
ideologically directed market monopoly. The party-state’s ability to regulate the market,
despite the industry’s nationwide popularity and economic substance, exemplifies the
power of the Chinese party state “central bank,” which monopolizes the art market for the
continued articulation and legitimacy of the CCP. Such phenomenon is identified in this
paper as “cultural industries with Chinese characteristics.”
Dr. Haili Ma lectures in Creative Industries and is the International Director at the
School of Performance and Cultural Industries, University of Leeds, UK. Haili was
trained in traditional Chinese opera from her early teens. She was a member of the
Shanghai Luwan All-Female Yue Opera Company (specializing in Xiaosheng, male role)
before coming to the United Kingdom in 1997, where she pursued her academic studies.
Her research focuses on the artistic evolution of traditional Chinese opera and its
contribution to sustainable socio-economic development. She is the author of Urban
Politics and Cultural Capital: The Case of Chinese Opera (Routledge, 2015).
Background
At the turn of the twenty-first century, a Northeast Chinese folk
performing art, errenzhuan, rose to form an entertainment industry with
unprecedented national and international fame. Errenzhuan literally
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means two people (erren) telling stories through performing different
roles (zhuan). In 1990, the then thirty-three-year-old Zhao Benshan, an
errenzhuan actor, was invited to perform a comedy sketch (xiaopin) at the
China Central Television (CCTV) Chinese New Year Gala and won
instant nationwide popularity. Following this, Zhao’s comedy sketch
became the highlight of the CCTV Chinese New Year Gala for the next
twenty-one consecutive years (Du 1998).1 The very name of Zhao
Benshan has since come to symbolize grassroots comedy and errenzhuan
laughter. In 2003, Zhao was selected as a Representative of the National
People’s Congress, the highest political position that may be bestowed
on a private citizen in China. In the same year, Zhao established the
Benshan Media Studio, using only errenzhuan actors to produce comic
soap operas with themes around the daily lives of Northeast rural
peasants. In2004, incollaborationwithLiaoningUniversity, Zhao setupa
series of errenzhuan BA programs. In 2007, Zhao purchased a theatre in
the city center of Shenyang, naming it the Liu Laogen Dawutai (Old Liu
Root Theatre).2 By 2014, there were eight franchised Old Liu Root
Theatres across China, each staging errenzhuan performances, with an
annual turnover of around 148million Yuan (Cao andHu 2011: 55; Hou
2008: 77; Kong, Zheng, Yu, and Zhu 2011: 227).
Despite this political and economic success, errenzhuan as an art
form has always been highly controversial. In 2010, Zhao Benshan and
his favorite apprentice Xiao Shenyang or Little Shenyang led an
errenzhuan troupe that toured in the United States. Local paper
Newsweek published an article reporting errenzhuan as “vulgar,” with the
title referred Xiao Shenyang as “the dirtiest man in China” (Liu and
Fish 2010). Han Zaifen, vice chair of the Chinese Theatre Association,
condemned errenzhuan as “grotesque, with not a trace of cultural value
anddepth” (Xing2011: 200).Criticismwas targetedmainly at errenzhuan’s
coarse and sexually connoted speech, to which Zhao responded that
“errenzhuan is like pig’s tripe, which will never be clean. Once it is
thoroughly cleansed, it is no longer errenzhuan” (Xinhua Net 2014).
The controversy continued and peaked on 15 October 2014,
after Xi Jinping delivered a speech at Beijing wenyi gongzuo zuotanhui
(Beijing Forum on Literature and Art), often referred to as the Beijing
Forum, following his succession to the Presidency. Xi stated: “Some art
works ridicule the sublime, warp the classics, subvert history, or defile
the masses and heroic characters. In others good and evil cannot be
distinguished, ugliness replaces beauty, and the dark side of society is
over-emphasized. Still others blindly chase and cater to public tastes
and vulgar interests, chase financial gain, and provoke the ecstasy of the
senses.” Xi emphasized the role of artists was “to serve the mass and the
Party” and arts “must not lose direction in the wave of market economy
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and be the slave of capital” (Xinhua 2015). In 2014, Zhao Benshan, who
had been amember of the National People’s Congress for a decade, was
not reelected, nor did he appear in the subsequent CCTV New Year
Gala. There has since been very little media exposure of errenzhuan.
China’s past thirty years of economic growth has generated a
substantial amount of research on rural migrants and urbanization
(Goodman 2014; Kanbur and Zhang 1999; Knight and Ramani, 2010;
Wang 2006; Zhang and Song 2003). Meanwhile, a new discourse on
Chinese cultural industries has emerged, examining the formation of
the art market in relation to cultural policy and CCP ideological
direction (Hartley and Keane 2006; Keane 2013; Kong 2014; Ma 2015;
O’Connor 2009; Sternberg 2017). However, very little research has
examined the socio-economic evolution of traditional art forms,
especially rural peasant folk forms.
This paper focuses on the evolution of errenzhuan, through
which it examines the development of the Chinese art market under
the dual pressures of economic, which means art institution must prove
they are profit-making entities, as well as ideological censorship. Zhao
Benshan is mentioned in the introduction to highlight the scale of
errenzhuan as an entertainment industry and stress the power of the
party-state in regulating the market. Taking an interdisciplinary
approach, this paper draws theories from folk comedy, cultural
industries, and CCP legitimacy to provide an analytical structure. This
paper argues that the trajectory of errenzhuan reveals the unique
characteristics of the Chinese cultural industry, as developed under
CCP’s ideologically directed market monopoly, for the continued
articulation and legitimation of the CCP. In this paper, I phrase it as
“cultural industries with Chinese characteristics.”
For the completionof this paper, I engaged in twomonths of field
research between January and February 2015 at ShenyangArts Research
Institute. Shenyang is the capital of the Northeast province of Liaoning.
Literature and documents about errenzhuan were accessed from local
libraries and the institute. I attended errenzhuan performances at the
Old Liu Root Theatre in Shenyang and nearby regions. With the
assistance of Shenyang Arts Research Institute, I interviewed around
twenty errenzhuan artists, script writers and directors, and conducted
audience focus groups. They form the empirical data base for this paper.
Section One: Theoretical Structure
Bakhtin’s Carnival, “A Pint of Tripes”
A large amount of material on comedy has been published, with
some focusing on China (Clasquin 2001; Davis and Chey 2013; Gao and
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Pugsley 2008). However, none is more appropriate than that of Bakhtin
to analyze the phenomena of errenzhuan. In Rabelais and His World,
Bakhtin developed Aristotle’s theory of laughter—as a unique
characteristic of the human species that acts as the ultimate wisdom
in folk humor. Bakhtin did not idealize folk humor, but described it as
grotesque, which in this context relates to abusive language and sex
(1984: 27). Bakhtin further articulates the concept of grotesque as “a
pint of tripes”: “Tripe, stomach, intestines are the bowels, the belly, the
very life of man. . . . It is believed that after cleaning, tripe still contained
ten percent excrement which was therefore eaten with the rest of the
meal” (p. 162). The folk coarse language, dirty jokes, sexual references,
jugglers performing, acrobatic tricks, and masquerade figures are
purely grotesque, carnivalesque themes, yet representing the vitality of
folk life (p. 96). This folk grotesque laughter is therefore “the defeat of
divine and human power, of authoritarian commandments and
prohibitions, of death and punishment after death, hell and all that
is more terrifying than the earth itself” (p. 91).
“A pint of tripes” has been themain reference for errenzhuan and
the focal point of debate. As will be discussed in full later in the article,
errenzhuan’s grotesque and coarse language, dirty jokes, sexual
references, and associated folk grotesque laughter is the very power
that the folk obtains to mock the official world, to reverse the authority,
and to obtain folk victory. Once “a pint of tripes” is thoroughly cleaned,
and the grotesque realism is eliminated under the dual pressures of
economic and ideological censorship, errenzhuan loses its essential folk
power of defiance and renewal. The ability of the Chinese party-state to
maintain ideological and economic market monopoly lies in its role as
the “central bank.”
CCP “Central Bank” and Legitimacy
The phrase “central bank” was coined by the famous French
cultural sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1998; Bourdieu and
Farage, 1994) who devised the concept of capital to measure social
hierarchical power. Bourdieu’s capital is not limited in the monetary
sense, but expands to a wide range of exchange forms. In Rethinking
the State,” Bourdieu sees the modern state emerging from “performa-
tive discourse” that both legitimates and constitutes the state as the
wielder of symbolic domination in the struggle for power:
The state is the culmination of a process of concentration of different species of
capital: capital of physical forces or instruments of coercion (army,
policy), economic capital, cultural capital, and symbolic capital. It is
this concentration as such which constitutes the state as the holder of a
sort of meta-capital granting power over other species of capital and
over their holders. (1994: 16)
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China, a regime structured on the Soviet model, has many
examples of the party-state acting as a “central bank” for market
monopoly and itsownlegitimacy.Back in1942,MaoZedongdeliveredhis
“Talk at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art” from the then CCP
headquarters inYan’an, inwhichhedeclared that therewasnosuch thing
as art for art’s sake. Rather, art was to serve theParty and thepeople (Mao
1965). The speech was aimed to inspire andmobilize the underclass, the
peasants, and working class, to join the CCP for the revolution, with
the promise of overturning a feudalistic system and for them to become
the masters of a new society. This vision proliferated through diverse
folk performing arts. It was through class mobilization that the CCP
established the People’s Republic of China and claimed sole legitimate
power in 1949, despite inferior military equipment and minimal
economic power. Throughout the1950s, theCCPcarriedoutnationwide
reform of folk performing arts, known as the xigai or traditional theatre
reform,3 through which the government redistributed political and
symbolic capitals, making folk art an institutionalized elite art form and
folk performers elite professional artists. In the post-Mao era, faced with
increased marketization and globalization, the CCP continued redis-
tribution of political and symbolic capitals, making new elite art forms
and artists to ensure ongoing CCP ideological articulation and
legitimation (Ma 2015: 2–10), such as the case with errenzhuan.
The initial rise of errenzhuan in the new millennium was the
result of direct CCP support through the reallocation of resources, such
as access to CCTV—which is under the tight management of the CCP
(Zhu and Berry 2009)—and bestow artists with political and symbolic
capital, such as the case of Zhao Benshan. It was through such
redistribution of political and symbolic capitals that enabled errenzhuan
to become a nationwide entertainment industry.
Power is based on recognition, which is why the dominant group
is eager to produce and reproduce their culture and beliefs.
Misrecognition, on the other hand, is what Bourdieu calls the function
of “symbolic violence,” which he defines as “the violence, which is
exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity” (1991: 167). In
other words, agents are subjected to forms of violence (treated as
inferior, denied resources, limited in their social mobility and
aspirations), but they do not perceive it that way; rather, their situation
seems to them “the natural order of things.” Upon receiving new
political and social status, errenzhuan artists become the “servants of the
state” and lose the folk power of mocking and challenging authority.
This wittingly or unwittingly exploited position is an act of symbolic
violence. It is within the system of party-state control of “central bank”
capitals that errenzhuan developed as a cultural industry.
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Cultural Industries with Chinese Characteristics
When Adorno first coined the phrase Culture Industry in the
1940s, he did not use it to celebrate a new economic opportunity, but to
describe the entrapment of artistic value. Adorno criticized the
capitalist market and profit-driven production which causes the
merging of both high and low cultural forms: “under capitalism all
production is for the market; goods are produced not in order to meet
human needs and desires but for the sake of profit, for the sake of
acquiring further capital” (Adorno 1991: 5). Adorno therefore
reminded readers not to take the phrase “industry” too literally as it
referred to the standardization of cultural forms, which cause both the
high and popular art forms to lose their tradition and spirituality
(Adorno 1991: 100).
The process of errenzhuan’s transformation from a distinct folk
art form to a standardized entertainment is precisely due to the market
requirement for making profit. However, the pressure was not just from
the necessity for economic market development, but was also
ideologically directed. Pan and Chan highlight that China’s party-
state has full involvement in promoting indigenous art forms as
nationalism to bolster Communist Party legitimacy (Pan and Chan
2000). China is increasingly on the same wavelength in terms of the use
of indigenous culture as soft power to enhance its position in global
politics (Huang and Sheng 2006; Xi 2014: 116).
When errenzhuan was perceived as being controversial to the
representation of China’s global cultural image, the CCP was able to
regulate the entire errenzhuan industry by withdrawing the two most
important capital forms—political and symbolic. This was exemplified
by Zhao Benshan’s exclusion from Xi Jinping’s 2014 speech at Forum on
Literature and Art and the membership of the National People’s
Congress. Consequently, errenzhuan lost these capitals which had
previously been converted into economic capitals for development
within the cultural market. The fate of errenzhuan therefore highlights
the distinction of Chinese cultural markets, which have developed
under the dual pressures of economic pressure and ideological
censorship. This phenomenon may be best interpreted as “cultural
industries with Chinese characteristics.”
Section Two: The Origin of Errenzhuan
Errenzhuan literally means two people (erren) telling stories
through performing different roles (zhuan). With no pre-fixed
character, no special costumes, the actors are able to perform the
world through (yi)zhuansheng, making a turn, hence the saying “qianjun
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wanma, jiushi zanliang (thousands of army and millions of horses, only
the two of us (to reign).” Errenzhuan focuses on folk love stories,
artistically having the following characteristics: chang (singing), zuo
(performing), wu (dancing), shuo (speaking), and jue (unique skills).
The name errenzhuan first appeared inTaidong Ribao (Tai DongDaily) in
1934 and was officially recorded in 1953 (Tian 2008: 4).
Scholars trace the origin of errenzhuan to two sources: a
Northeastern ancient fertility-praying dance and a beggars’ story-
telling performance which entered the Northeast from central China
(Li 2007; Wang 2009). Traditionally, after a day’s toil, especially in
the long harsh winter, laborers would gather together on top of a
Dongbei heated brick bed to chat and to sing errenzhuan. The singing
absorbs various traditional Chinese qupai (music structures). One of
the most frequently used is wuhaihai, with distinctive “aihai, aihaihai”
at the end of each sentence to enhance expressive feelings (Zhao
2003: 66).
When the singing becomes lively, wu (dancing) would take
place. The dancing combines styles of the ancient fertility-praying and
Northeastern yangge (rice field dance)4 with movements focusing on
hips, following an 8-shaped pattern. In errenzhuan, the female is
regarded as the “Goddess” and traditionally takes the lead role or
shangzhuang in chang, zuo, and wu, to be followed by the male role,
known as xiazhuang or chou (the clown). Xiazhuang would ensure to be
slightly lower than shangzhuang, with the focal point of following and
supporting shangzhuang fixed on her hips. Females may use a
handkerchief and males a fan as props (Zhang 2014: 89). With the
actors’ ability to zhuan (performing different roles), the limited space
within a house is transformed into the world stage.
In an interview I conducted with the errenzhuan star ZhaoHaiyan
in 2015, Zhao showedme the clipXixiang guanhua (Watching Flowers at
the Western Chamber), and explained in detail how the above artistic
characters are executed. Today, it is one of the most popularly
performed traditional errenzhuan pieces. In this clip, the shangzhuang
character Cui Yingying is followed closely by the xiazhuang character,
the maid Hongniang (Red Lady), performed in this case by Zhao’s
husband Yan Guangming. Xiazhuang does not have any special costume
nor makeup to resemble Hongniang, and in the full stage production,
he switches instantaneously between the play’s supporting roles of
Hongniang, Cui’s lover Zhangsheng, Cui’s mother, monks, and other
roles. Every role is performed in full through the two performers’
ability of zhuan. The dancing style in this video is refined, but yangge
movement is apparent, and the wuhaihai qupai forms a clear musical
structure amidst modern instruments (Zhao 2015):
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CUI YINGYING: As soon as I, Cui Yingying, enter the garden, aihai,
aihaihai;
HONGNIANG: I raise head to see, aihai, aihaihai;
CUI YINGYING: The flowers and grass of the garden, aihai, aihaihai;
HONGNIANG: Blooming extra beautifully, aihai, aihaihai.
(Zhao and Yan: 0:11–0:33)
Grotesque realism, dirty jokes, and coarse language are essential to
errenzhuan, and these parts are led by the male chou, through shuo and
jue. In this part of the performance, the male chou will lead the
narration, sexually teasing his partner, interacting with and amusing
the audience. Symbolic erotic acting with sexual connotation is
performed through physical touching. This is the reason why errenzhuan
stage partners are exclusively married couples (Hou 2008; Hu 2013;
Yang 2007). However, the most animated sections are traditionally
performed with a time and location restriction—either following amid-
night rule at home, when children have been put to bed or in the “red
light” districts. Yang Pu, a professor specializing in errenzhuan and
Director of the Northeast Arts Research Center at Jilin University,
explains the reasons for the highly charged sexual connotation and its
related popularity associated with historical migrants to Guanwai
(literally “outside the border” [of north China], another name for
Northeast China):
Guanwai men have historically lived in an environment with little sex
and love, simply because they didn’t have the financialmeans to pursue
it. Many laborers came to the Northeast to work in mines and forests.
These groups of laborers had very little opportunity to meet females.
Under harsh economic and social conditions, many could not afford to
get married. Even among married people, most of them had arranged
marriages, with little love. Lack of sexual opportunity and satisfied
sexual activities lead to strong desires for sex and love. Explicit sexual
dirty storytelling provided satisfaction for the illusion of fulfilled sexual
desire. (Yang 2010: 149)
However, I would like to push this analysis further by arguing
that the grotesque sexual connotation of the performance not only
comforts the folk but allows them to challenge the official world. For
example, the poem “Jingyuesi” (Homesick in the Moonlit Night),
which was composed by Chinese poet Li Bai during the Tang Dynasty
(618–907) and has long been regarded as the exemplary literature of
the learned class, is also popular in errenzhuan. Instead of the official
lines of “raising my head to look at the bright moon, lowering my head
and miss my hometown,” in errenzhuan, the actor sings the couplet as
“raise my head to look at the bright moon, lower my head to pull down
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my trousers (to masturbate)” (Wang 2009: 45). The humor arises from
rhymed metaphors aligned with erotic sexuality with emphasis placed
on lower body sexual organs, which is the very essence of folk life, as
Bakhtin highlights, and through which the official world is mocked and
power reversed.
Such explicit sexual connotation and folk laughter not only
create an alternative world for the lower-class male, but also for females
who suffer the dual repressions of class and gender. In the Chinese
classical literature, Xixiang ji (Romance of the Western Chamber), one
episode involves the youngmaidHongniang who facilitates hermistress
to secretly meet her beloved young scholar as a symbolic rebellion
against the will of the family. In all other Chinese theatrical versions, the
story focuses on Hongniang’s linguistic wit. However, the errenzhuan
adaptation of the Western Chamber meeting has specific emphasis on
the actual sexual intercourse: after Zhang Junrui meets Cui Yingying in
the chamber, due to excitement and anxiety Zhang cannot obtain an
erection. In order to “save the rarely obtained occasion,” Hongniang
decides to sexually “sacrifice” herself to arouse both Zhang and Cui.
Afterwards, Zhang asks Hongniang how she could be so “knowledge-
able” at such a young age and her reply is: “If the old master had
not been dead, I could easily be your number two mother-in-law”
(Wang 2009: 77). Such an angle of storytelling offers an explicit
challenge to the Confucian patriarchal system, where females,
especially young female servants, were placed at the bottom of the
hierarchical structure of gender, class, and age. In this alternative
world, a servant girl obtains superiority through sex and publicly
announces her victory based on her sexual performativity.
Through the carnival aspects of linguistic “grotesque realism”
and degradation, errenzhuan builds “its own world in opposition to the
official world, its own state versus the official state” (Bakhtin 1984: 21),
and those involved obtain renewal and revival. In Northeast China,
locals describe their devotion to errenzhuan by saying that they “would
rather spare a meal than errenzhuan.” Food, to the lower social class is
themost precious of goods. To prioritize the consumption of errenzhuan
over food demonstrates the extreme popularity of this art form
amongst the locals (Yang 2007; Yang and Sun 2013). Under the
aforementioned traditional theatre reform implemented in the Mao
era, while errenzhuan as a folk form achieved unprecedented artistic
standards and peasant singers gained elite status, the once intimate
actor–audience relationship was nonetheless broken. Accordingly, the
form’s folk power to mock the official world was diminished, leading to
the decline of errenzhuan’s popularity. Since the post-Mao market
reform of the 1980s, in particular from the 1992 marketization onward,
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there has been rapid emergence of a body of independent errenzhuan
performers who actively turned errenzhuan into a popular regional art
form, leading to the state-sponsored errenzhuan entertainment industry
in the new millennium.
Section Three: Cultural Industries with Chinese
Characteristics
Dual Censorship: Economic and Ideological
While the world has witnessed the unprecedented speed and
scale of China’s marketization and globalization over the past thirty
years, China also experienced large-scale human migration, especially
that from the countryside to the city. Lacking modern education and
skills, the immigrants have mostly taken on low skilled labor work at
construction sites or in factories (Sargeson 2016; Wang 2006). In the
Northeast region, however, there is another job opportunity that is
open to the peasants: to sing errenzhuan.
In the mid-1990s, in the medium sized city Changchun alone,
there were half a dozen small- to medium-sized theatres that specialized
in errenzhuan, with over ten thousand independent errenzhuan actors
actively searching for work. Nearly all were rural peasants (Tian 1996:
160). Each night, theatre managers would invite around five pairs of
errenzhuan actors, each given a performing slot of between twenty to
thirty minutes. Zhao Benshan, when looking back at his early career,
describes the limited time as “tough”: “if you could not make the
audience laugh, you would be kicked out of the theatre by the manager
and there was no coming back” (Zhao 2006).
However, it was increasingly difficult to make audiences laugh
through traditional errenzhuan storytelling. The main audience who
had the economic capital to attend theatres in the 1990s was the youth
that grew up in the 1960s and 1970s. They had little exposure to
traditional literature and the errenzhuan art form. Meanwhile, over-
whelming numbers of national and international entertainments
poured onto the Chinese market competing for consumers. Zhang
Bangsong, a journalist from Qianxi zhoubao (New Millennium Weekly)
describes the situation in the 1990s as: “No audience liked to hear
traditional errenzhuan singing. Most of the time, performers were
shooed off the stage halfway through their performance” (quoted in
Wang and Cheng 2011: 179). Faced with new market demand, the
independent errenzhuan artists showed little hesitation in evolving the
art form to please the consumers.
Actors keenly adopted diverse high art and popular art forms,
ranging from humor clips, pop songs, andWestern dance, to strengthen
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their ownperforming styles. For the errenzhuan actors, therewas only one
purpose: tomake the audience laugh. However, the performers’ agenda
was no longer for simultaneous uncrowning and renewal, but for
economic gain (Tian 1996; Wang and Cheng 2011; Zhao 2006). By the
late 1990s, errenzhuan had become a popular regional entertainment
form,mainly amongst theNortheastworking class andpeasant audience.
Locals described the scene of errenzhuan troupes performing in the rural
countryside as “millions of people watching errenzhuan” (wanren weiguan
errenzhuan) (Zhang2014: 12).Errenzhuan couldhave remaineda regional
popular culture; however, a new CCP ideological direction of promoting
indigenous folk culture propelled errenzhuan to develop an entertain-
ment industry at a national level.
In the 1990s, China experienced a TV boom. By 2000, 1.19
billion had access to television, representing 92 percent of the
population (Hazelbarth 1997: 1; Li 2010). Alongside the rising number
of television consumers was an increasing flow of television stations,
both nationally and internationally, targeting the Chinese-speaking
consumers (Zhu and Berry 2009: 12). There was a growing awareness of
using native culture to build a national identity, and errenzhuan, by then
a traditional folk form turned regional popular culture for the working
class and peasants, was recognized as being an ideal subject to reinforce
the CCP founding ideology and legitimacy (Dai 2001; Jiang 2003; Su
2011). Various regional TV stations began to invite errenzhuan actors
onto their programs, and the most prominent among them was the
CCTV (Zhang 2014: 9–34). Yu Xiaofei, an errenzhuan star performer,
describes the sudden access to media and the rise of errenzhuan’s
national popularity:
It all started in the early 2000s; Zhao Benshan was already famous then.
But suddenly many (errenzhuan actors) were invited. The first program
I recorded was called Fangniuwa (The Cow Herd). It was a comedy
sketch about my vocal skills in imitating the sound of rural life. Well,
the moment it was broadcasted, I became famous. Countless people
wrote to CCTV, wanting to see more of my shows. I was invited back
three times to record further programs. Once I was famous on CCTV, I
was invited to record programs in many regional television channels. I
toured more than a hundred cities in China and dozens abroad. There
is very little or no fee for recording a television program, but once you
are famous on TV, all theatres want you and they do pay very
handsomely. (Yu 2015)
There are several key issues revealed by Yu: Firstly, the link
between media promotion and errenzhuan’s national rise in popularity.
The extensive broadcasting by central and then regional TV stations
redistributed ‘central bank’ capital, that facilitated errenzhuan’s quick
rise to national fame. Secondly, instead of inviting errenzhuan couples to
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perform traditional errenzhuan, it mainly targeted the clown role, often
with excellent acting skills, to perform script-based comical sketches.
Thirdly, and most importantly, is the increasingly fierce competition
within the errenzhuan entertainment market. These three factors
resulted in errenzhuan’s artistic evolution.
Following the rise in CCTVexposure,more peasants saw learning
errenzhuan as the way to gain fame and capital. Growing numbers of
peasant children enrolled in errenzhuan schools, leading to an expansion
of the errenzhuan education market. By 2005, nearly every city in the
Northeasthadat leastone errenzhuan school; in Jilingcity,ZhaoBenshan’s
hometown, there were over thirty errenzhuan schools, many recruiting
between threehundred and five hundred students annually, themajority
of whom from rural countryside (Zhang 2014: 128). Despite the growing
supply of trained errenzhuan actors, market demand for errenzhuan
remained limited. Yu Xiaofei stated that there was no financial gain for
appearing on TV and that the theatre was the only means of making a
living. This means increasing numbers of actors were competing for
limited performing opportunities, leading to the standardization of the
art formwhere actors were only differentiated by the increasing amounts
of sexual connotation they were prepared to insert into their
performance. Yan Guoqing, manager of Harbin Longjiang Theatre,
describes the errenzhuan market in the late 2000s as follows:
Errenzhuan allows peasants to earn tens of thousands a year. It is
unthinkable for peasants in any other trade. However, 99% of
errenzhuan performers are from the rural countryside. To take myself as
an example, I have received only primary education. Most errenzhuan
performers are illiterate. In order to earn money and to make the
audience laugh, they would do anything. But most errenzhuan
performers are mediocre. Facing increasing market competition,
the easiest and the quickest way to make money is to imitate others and
to increase sexual reference to attract audience. The result? We have
the “bottle neck” effect—whichever the theatre you attend, you see the
same errenzhuan content with increased coarse language and erotic
jokes (huang duanzi). (Yan 2015)
For folk oral art, imitation and repetition are important parts of
creativity (Walter 1982). To improvise through memory and to
incorporate learned skills into artistic development is key to many
oral art forms across the world (Ma 2015). Traditionally, it has been key
for errenzhuan actors to watch their peers, to learn and imitate their
skills and incorporate them into their own performance to improve
their artistic creativity. However, the era of media recording has
changed the rules of the game, and the concept and practice of
creativity. Instead of testing one’s memory and improvisational skills,
direct imitation from recorded media forms has been the norm.
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Errenzhuan becomes increasingly normalized and standardized, often
named errenxiu.
The late character of the term, “xiu” is a phonetic translation of
“show.” Errenxiu refers to two actors performing brief clips of traditional
singing,moderndance, instrumentplaying, and acrobatics, interspersed
with coarse jokes. Here is a typical errenxiu performed by Xiao Shenyang
andhis wife ShenChunyang in 2008 at a Tianjin local festival. In the near
tenminutesof theirperformance, the traditional errenzhuanartisticorder
of chang (singing), zuo (performing),wu (dancing), shuo (speaking), and
jue (unique skills) has been changed to the following formula:
1) 0:00–3:40 shuo, shared by both female shangzhuang and male
xiazhuang chou role; the chou Xiao Shenyang, dressed in a female
floral blouse and wearing a green hairpin, hops onto the stage,
where his wife Shen Chuyang calls him an Australian kangaroo that
is unable to (evolve) to a human.
2) 3:40–4:40 chang (traditional errenzhuan), led by shangzhuang and
followed by xiazhuang; toward the end, xiazhuang does a jue, by
running from the side stage to central stage with a piece of flower
and jumps into the air before landing in front of shangzhuang,
offering the flower to her.
3) 4:40–6:20 shuo, led by xiazhuang chou role, who interacts with the
audience.
4) 6:20–8:30 chang (a pop song) by xiazhuang chou, in Cantonese and
from the famous film Qiannu youhun (A Ghost Story), while walking
amongst the audience greeting them and asking for more applause.
5) 8:30–8:55 shuo, led by xiazhuang chou role who interacts with the
audience.
6) 8:55–9:45 chang (continuing the previous pop song).
7) 9:45–9:55 shuo, led by xiazhuang chou who comments on the selected
audience interaction skills as “you are like a tomb to me; you scare
me to death” (Tengxun Media 2008).
In total, there is only one-minute chang (traditional errenzhuan),
compared to four-minute chang (pop song) and seven-minute shuo,
which includes four minutes of interaction with the audience. This
form of performance has become “standard errenxiu.”
Increasingly, an army of peasant performers are trained in
errenxiu to enter the wider entertainment industry such as tourist theme
parks, or as extras in large-scale performances and other minor acting
roles. The evolution of errenzhuan, from once powerful folk grotesque
realism for renewal and revival to twenty-first century errenxiu as
standardized entertainment for service-based mass consumption,
illustrates vividly what Adorno warned us in the 1940s about the
corruption of economic censorship and the loss of authenticity and
creativity of art form, be it high or popular (Adorno 1991:10–13). The
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distinction of Chinese cultural industries is highlighted through the
corruption of errenzhuan under the dual pressures of economic success
and ideological censorship.
Possible Clean Tripe?
In 2009, the errenzhuan star Xiao Shenyang was invited to Jiangsu
provincial TV studio for a live interview. It was chaired by nationally
renowned female host Zhao Danjun. During the recording, Xiao
Shenyang addressed Zhao as chou buyaoliande, which literally means
“stinky shameless one” but amidst errenzhuan coarse language is only a
mild tease, similar to the English expression of “piss off.” However, to
utter such a phrase to a female TV host, in a mass media venue with
millions viewing, was perceived by Zhao as a serious insult. Zhao
demanded an apology and when it was not delivered, she walked out of
the recording studio and the show was cancelled. The story did not end
there. Through social media, the story was circulated across the nation
and interestingly, most netizens showed support to Xiao Shenyang. The
phrase “stinky shameless one” became an instant popular youth
expression nationwide (Chongqing News 2009).
The CCP may have favored errenzhuan in the early 2000s as
positive folk culture in support of soft power, but by the mid-2010s its
attitude began to change. By 2012 China’s internet users soared to the
top in the world, followed by the United States (Global Internet
Report 2016). Nearly 46 percent of the total population of internet
users in China are youth (CNNIC 2016; DeBell and Chapman 2006;
Lei 2011). There is increasing concern over regulating public media
use and much talk of internet security (Cheung 2009; Jing 2014).
Whereas traditional errenzhuan used to have a mid-night or “red light”
time and location restriction, and television and theatre errenzhuan or
errenxiu performances in the new millennium could be regulated,
internet surfers had more freedom in selecting their preferred clips
for viewing. It was the sketches with the most explicit sexual dialogue
that became the most widely downloaded and viewed, often by
audiences who were curious about what errenzhuan was and its associ-
ated reputation of “a pint of tripes.” Although humor’s subversive
quality may not be able to overturn a social system (Westwood 2004:
11), errenzhuan’s nationwide popularity, associated with grotesque
image and sexual language as well as wide internet accessibility, caused
increasing uneasiness amongst CCP promoters of ideological
tendency and national identity building (Zhang 2010). Mounting
scrutiny was placed on errenzhuan, focusing on its training schools and
theatres. We hear the following from the Director of a Shenyang
errenzhuan School:
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Errenzhuan schools nowadays forbid students to learn any sexual
related jokes—no matter how mild they may be. There is a female
errenzhuan performer, famous for saying rude jokes. Yes, she was
extremely popular in theatre circles, but she did not last long. Why?
Once she was invited to Jilin TV studio to record a performance and it
was never shown. There were far too many dirty jokes. Since then, she
has hardly received any invitations for stage performance. No theatre
wants any trouble from the government. (Anonymous 2015)
Zhao Benshan may have once boldly dismissed criticism of
errenzhuan as “pig’s tripe” and insisted that “once the tripe has been
cleansed thoroughly, it is no longer errenzhuan,” but under aggregated
pressure, Zhao led the promotion of “Green Errenzhuan.” Green in
this context refers to clean and purified, as opposed to yellow and
pornographic. Zhao would allegedly fine any actor who told any coarse
jokes in his franchised theatres. It has now become the joint
determination, of both the CCP and the errenzhuan actors, to have
the pig’s tripe thoroughly cleansed.
In January 2015, I attended errenzhuan performances in the
famous Shenyang Old Liu Root Theatre. It was the very first franchised
theatre acquired by Zhao Benshan and has the reputation of producing
the most authentic and highest quality errenzhuan nationwide. The
three-hour performance consisted of pairs of actors delivering their
performances. Each primarily involved dialogue sketches or skits,
interspersed with clips of traditional errenzhuan singing and dancing,
mild slapstick comedy, imitation of popular songs, acrobatic perfor-
mance, and interactive dialogues with the audience. The entire show
contained no coarse jokes, in fact no sexual reference at all. Instead,
throughout the night, during switches between pairs of actors, there
were video clips projected onto the theatre screen, narrating how
errenzhuan has evolved from a coarse folk peasant art form to the “Green
Errenzhuan,” fit for the consumption of any one, any age, under CCP’s
leadership.
Despite this submission, the turning point finally arrived. In late
2014, Zhao Benshan, the representative figure of errenzhuan, having
served for a decade as a member of the National People’s Congress, was
not invited to attend Xi Jinping’s speech at the Forum on Literature and
Art at Beijing. In February 2015, after twenty-one years of consecutive
performance, Zhao did not appear in the CCTV New Year Gala. There
has since been very little media exposure of errenzhuan and related
entertainment forms, as if the entire industry disappeared overnight
(South ChinaMorning Post, 2015).Westwood vividly described how the
power of folk humor and its subversive qualities cannot always be
managed (2004: 775). However, with the Chinese party-state’s role as
the “central bank,” any form of cultural industry can fall as fast as it was
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allowed to rise. The evolution of errenzhuan highlights the distinction of
the Chinese art market, which is developed under the dual pressures of
economic success as well as ideological censorship, for the continued
articulation of CCP legitimacy.
Conclusion
By tracing the evolution of errenzhuan from a Northeast folk
performing art to a popular nationwide entertainment industry, only to
crumble under one stroke of CCP political redirection, this paper has
examined the uniqueness of the Chinese art market, which is
developed under the dual pressures of economic success and CCP
ideological censorship. The standardized errenzhuan created under
these dual pressures led to the diminishment of its original folk power
and authenticity, annulling the possibility for the folks to build an
alternative world, to mock and to renew.
Writing in the era of Soviet totalitarian power, Bakhtin saw folk
laughter as the force to challenge the official ideology and was arrested
for his work. However, Lunacharsky, one of Bakhtin’s contemporaries
who set up a Soviet government commission to study satiric genres,
especially their connection with folk festivals such as the carnival,
stressed that “carnival was a kind of safety valve for passions the
common peoplemight otherwise direct to revolution,” which lightened
Bakhtin’s original sentence after his arrest in 1929 (Bakhtin 1984: xviii).
Laughter is indispensable in balancing the totalitarian rule, to act as the
safety valve for the very existence of the official institution.
I would like to end this paper with this piece of news: inDecember
2015, after Zhao Benshan’s year-long disappearance from the public
sphere, and rumors of the uncertain fate of errenzhuan, theOld Liu Root
Theatre’s Beijing branch reopened. The lowest ticket price was set at
580 yuan (about 90USD), whichwas enough to deter any of the ordinary
audience members who may be interested in viewing errenzhuan. It is
difficult to say if such a high price was purposely marked by the
government to highlight the commercialization of errenzhuan or
otherwise. There are also now very occasional TV programs with invited
errenzhuan actors performing their latest comedy sketches on CCTV.
Meanwhile, in the Northeast region, errenzhuan remains as a popular
performance, in both traditionalmale–female sing-song performance as
well as the midnight explicit sexual story entertainment. The important
thing is that errenzhuan continues to exist.
The new millennium’s media and cultural industries have
brought the folk art form of errenzhuan new opportunities as well as new
challenges. With Xi Jinping’s emphasis on the artists’ role “to serve the
mass and the Party,” artists and art forms will continue to negotiate their
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space for survival between the gaps of economic and ideological
censorship. This paper provides a glimpse of the conditions of the
Chinese cultural market, which is developed under economic pressure
as well as CCP ideologically directed monopolization. The party-state’s
ability to regulate the market, despite the industry’s extreme market
success, exemplifies the power of the Chinese party-state “central
bank,”whichmonopolizes the artmarket for the continued articulation
and legitimation of the CCP.
NOTES
1. Zhao missed the 1994 performance due to late arrival.
2. Old Liu Root or Liu Laogen originated from a successful comic soap
opera series of the same name, directed by and starring Zhao Benshan. The
program was broadcast in 2002 by CCTV and gained instant national
popularity. Old Liu Root has since become the brand name for Zhao Benshan
artistic work.
3. Xigai or traditional theatre reforms took place in the 1950s are
often referred as sangai (three reforms). They involved a process of
establishing state folk theatre houses (gaizhi or reform the system), elevating
folk actor’s historical underclass status to that of professional artists (gairen or
reform the artists), and changing traditional folk improvisational style of
productions to compulsory written scripts (gaixi or reform of performance),
with superstitious and sexual connotation eliminated. Chinese traditional
theatre companies in the new millennium have continued to exist under the
structure of the reform.
4. Yangge is a popular Northern China folk dance. It consists of the
movements of three steps forward and one step backward, pause, and repeat.
Props involve a fan, a handkerchief, and a fake donkey.
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